



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

toriness, they "help themselves" to them and eat them up; and all nature celebrates, like them, these open mysteries, which demonstrate what the truth of sensuous things is.

[v.] But those who make such assertions, [p. 81] say, as above remarked, immediately the converse of what they mean; a phenomenon which is perhaps the best calculated to arouse reflection concerning the nature of sensuous certitude. They speak of the extant being of *external* objects, which, more closely, may be determined as *real* ones, as absolutely particular, wholly personal, individual things, each one of which has no longer its absolute equivalent; that this extant Being has absolute certitude and truth. They mean *this* piece of paper upon which I write (or rather have written); but they do not say what they mean. If they really wanted to say this piece of paper which they mean, (and they do,) this is impossible, since the sensuous This which is meant, is unapproachable by language; for that belongs to consciousness—the in itself Universal. During the actual attempt to express it, it would rot; those who had commenced its description could not complete it but would have to leave it to others who would finally themselves acknowledge that they were engaged in describing what no longer existed. Hence although they mean

this piece of paper which is entirely a different one from that above, yet they speak of "actual things," "external or sensuous objects," "absolute individual essence," &c., i. e. they say of them only the Universal; for this reason that which is called the unspeakable is nothing else than the untrue, the unreasonable, that which is merely "meant."—If nothing more is said of something than that it is an actual thing, an external object, then one has said only the most general thing of it, and with this has been expressed rather its likeness with everything, than its difference. If I say a *particular thing*, I say it rather as a universal, for each is a particular thing; and moreover, a *This thing* is anything which one pleases. More closely designated as *this piece of paper*,—so is every piece of paper a *this piece of paper*, and I have still merely said the general. But [p. 82] if I will not allow language which possesses the divine nature, immediately to invert the meaning and thus not permit it to put in a word, but hasten to its assistance by *exhibiting* this piece of paper, then I learn by experience what the truth of sensuous certitude is in fact; I point it out as a Here which is a Here of other Here's; or in itself a simple complex of many Here's, i. e. a Universal, and thus I apprehend it as it in truth is, and instead of *knowing* an Immediate, I *perceive* it.

ANALYSIS OF HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY.

"The special object of the Phenomenology was, by a development of consciousness in its essential principle, to establish what was to Hegel the absolute cognition,—to demonstrate this cognition to be but the highest step and stage of consciousness. Hegel gives, in this work, a history of consciousness as it appears in time (hence the title), an evolution of the epochs of the growth of consciousness, on its way to philosophical knowledge."

[Schwegler's Hist. Phil.—Stirling's Translation.]

The work under consideration, usually called the first original work of Hegel, appeared in 1807. Some think it "the most obscure of Hegel's works," but by himself it is called his "Voyage of Discovery." The true student of philosophy must regard it as the greatest work in the whole history of thought. In it are unfolded in their natural order all the *aperys* of pure science (*prima philosophia*) and these are,

at the same time, recognized in the various concrete forms that they have assumed in the world; thus exhibiting in a sort of dramatic spectacle the development of the *motives* of human history. Institutions of civilization, phases of psychological culture, historical revolutions, the genesis of so-called "faculties of the mind"—all these are shown to have their necessity in the final cause, the realization of spirit.

That which is potentially self-conscious—the individual soul, which, as Leibnitz teaches, is a monad and even in its lowest stage of development reflects the whole universe—must become actually so, must dissolve all objective forms by aid of its alchemy and see in the universe only its own infinitude.

Such a conception is embodied in a popular form in the religious doctrine of creation. God creates man in his own image for his honor and glory. He creates man in order that there may be a being that can recognize him. Thus, the end of man is stated to be the recognition of God. But God, too, is the infinite person, the Ego or eternal subject who makes possible all self-consciousness whatever. Hence, the individual in recognizing God or Eternal Reason, recognizes his own true being. The Creator is the essence of the creature, and the latter must recognize the former if it would recognize its own essence.

In the preface to this work, Hegel takes occasion to advance the claims of what he considers the true method of philosophy, against views then prevalent. Thus, according to him, philosophy should be a scientific exposition of truth and have a strictly systematic form; it should not be a mere series of genial philosophemes. First principles are only beginnings. They are seeds; their truth is their development into organic systems. The acorn is an oak in its abstract and hence untrue form. But while advocating system he is careful to discriminate the true method from inadequate methods, such, for example, as that of Spinoza and Wolff (the mathematical method) and that of the disciples of Schelling (a schematizing formalism). The mathematical method is defective in that its procedure is arbitrary; the demonstrator has in view the final "*quod erat*," etc., and makes this and that construction, postulates these and demonstrates those preliminaries, refers now to an axiom and then to a definition—all without showing the necessity of the procedure. In the end, one perceives why the demonstrator pursued the course he did, but he sees too that it was subjective choice that

guided. The mathematical method is not a method for discovering truth, but only of *communicating truth after it is seen*. Again, the method of "schematizing formalism," in which one merely classifies data obtained from experience according to a ready-made scheme, does not arrive at a true system any more than the labelled bottles of the apothecary constitutes such. It is the disease prevalent among philosophical diletanti, to use a few abstract categories on all occasions and subsume everything under them.

The true method seizes the subject-matter and holds it fast; first taking it according to its most obvious phase, it allows it to show up its presuppositions one after the other until we have the elements constituting quite a different object, before us.* The three stages of an exhaustive systematic treatment are those of *immediateness*, *mediation*, and *absolute mediation*. (See Vol. i. of this journal, pp. 3-4; Vol. ii., p. 1.)

The difficulty of Hegel to new beginners lies in their inability to mark the transitions from one of these stages to the other. And not only do they fail to separate these stages, but they fail to distinguish even the discursive remarks ("external reflections," with which he opens the subject, from the rigid scientific treatment that follows.

In the chapter of the translation before us, the paragraphs from [a.] to [e.], inclusive, contain only external reflections; from [f.] to [i.], inclusive, we have the immediate stage; from [k.] to [m.] the stage of mediation; from [n.] to [s.], inclusive,

* We quote from an admirable article on Hegel, by J. E. Cabot, North American Review, No. ccxix., p. 456:

"The essence of Hegel's method consists in taking any statement, any fact that offers, at its own valuation, and treating it as if it were truth. In this way its inherent limitations are sure to show themselves, and not simply as error, but as an advance towards a more complete statement." "It is a favorite device of Hegel's to show how the paradoxes and self-contradictions which the understanding perpetually encounters, but which it usually dodges and derides as metaphysical subtilities when called to notice them, are in reality the coming to light of what is wanting in its own statements, and needed to make them true."

the absolute mediation. Then follow—[t.] to [v.]—some more reflections to show where we are with our result. Let us examine the content more minutely:

[a.] Since it is evident that we cannot comprehend a result without first considering the premises, we are obliged to neglect all forms of knowing that are obviously inferential, and apply ourselves first to what seems to be immediate or intuitional knowing. Of course, we do not know, until it has been demonstrated to us, that such intuitional knowing is not entirely sufficient.

[b.] It offers itself as the truest and most satisfactory mode of knowing. It seems to give us the very concrete reality itself. But, in fact, such certitude merely says "it is" and does not say aught of the definite distinctions and limits which belong to the object and give it individuality. An object is through its relations to other objects, and a relation cannot be cognized *immediately*. To cognize a relation implies that the sensuous intuition be made a tool in the hands of a higher—a synthetic mode of cognition. The senses cannot draw inferences; they merely give premises. But premises such as they furnish are not things, but mere elements of things—mere abstractions or determinations.

[c.] Moreover, it is evident upon reflection that every immediate certitude involves the distinction and determination of subject and object, and that such distinction and determination is a mediation, and hence we have a relation and not a simple immediate. When I say, "This object is," a ground is implied: "because I see it." But this implied ground will render it untrue the moment I look somewhere else. If I assert it on the ground that I saw it, or that *some one else saw it*, then I am asserting the truth upon other grounds than immediate sensuous certitude, and involve a complicated series of grounds such as memory, language, definitions, credibility of testimony, etc., etc.

[d.] We need not, however, continue these reflections; let us rather summon this certitude before us and note its procedure.

[e.] Its first attitude must be that of the mere assertion of the simple existence of the object without conditioning its assertion by introducing the Ego as in any way essential to the truth of the assertion.

[f.] The senses can testify only of what is *present* to them in time and space—the Now and the Here. Any assertion on their part, will be a predication of some content or other to the Here or the Now, for example: "The Now is night." "The Here is a tree." But experience shows at once that the individual contents of the Now and Here, which the senses testify of, do not abide.

[g.] The subject and predicate of the sensuous assertion do not coincide. The Now and Here are universals, and of any particular content that is attributed to them, we can with equal propriety deny the truth or affirm it. The universal is both affirmative and negative at the same time. Therefore, each particular act of sensuous certitude refutes all others and is refuted in turn by them.

[h.] Language seizes the abiding, and hence, the universal. No particular content of sensuous certitude can be communicated.

[i.] "The Here is a tree" is not true, for the reason that the Here is anything else that happens to be present to the senses, and the mentioned assertion does not tell which senses are meant. The senses themselves must be taken into consideration, for it is their presence that makes the Now night or day. The *meaning* is the essential condition which gives truth to the assertion. I must add to the assertion this condition and always be particular to state the subject who knows.

[k.] Therefore, the first attitude of the sensuous certitude toward its object must be changed. It has found that the object cannot be asserted purely, but that the assertion must bring with it at the same time a voucher for the truth by adding the essential condition, namely, the Ego who means the particular content asserted. It is this "*meaning*" that prevents our certitude from inverting itself.

[l.] Let us examine this new attitude

and see what will come of it: "The Now which I see is day;" "the Here which I see is a tree." But it is obvious at once that we are still in difficulty, for we cannot tell what we mean by "I." Every observer is a subject or "I," and his object is in a Here and Now.

[m.] The Ego is as universal as the Here and Now. In fact, we cannot say what we mean. The particular, for itself, that we wish to seize by a sensuous intuition seems to escape us.

[n.] It is evident that we have failed in our attempts thus far. But there is still one way left. We posited the objective as essence at first, and then we posited the subjective as essence; now we can posit their union as essence, and beyond this we cannot go, but shall be obliged to give up the cause and refuse all truth to sensuous certitude if here it fails.

[o.] The truth is seized in the relation of the Ego to the object, and both are alike essential in it.

[p.] Let us now finally see whether the immediateness of the relation can be preserved, considered in and for itself.

[q. r. s.] The point of time (the Now) and the point of space (the Here), or the This in general, can be seized only through other points or This's which fix and define the former. From this, it is evident that every sensuous knowing must involve an activity having three stages: (1) I seize the object as This, but I cannot do it (2) except by separating it from the Not-this which of course must also be my object while I am engaged in the process. (3) Therefore, in seizing an object, I necessarily transcend it (and cancel it) and seize it in identity with another or higher totality which includes its other-being or limits. And hence, my act of seizing it (in a cognition) is a three-fold act which negates as well as posits or affirms the object.

The Universal is the unity of the partic-

ular and its other-being (*alterum*); it is the Finite and that on which it depends. The Me and Not-Me together make the totality, and the Universal is this totality. No object can be completely known until all its complications with other things are unravelled. The shallowest Knowing must accomplish this to some degree. The sensuous certitude (it must be allowed) can know only what occupies Space or Time; but whatever is extended in Space or Time must be a compound having parts, and the sensuous Knowing is a seizing of such parts in their synthesis, and hence a mediation.

We find in this third attitude of the certitude an answer to the question: Can we know immediately? This answer is: No, for objects themselves are mediated and hence require mediated knowing, if they are to be known in their truth.

A knowing of an object sensuously, involves a distinguishing and uniting of the above and below, right and left, before and after, &c., and such a knowing is not an immediate but a mediate, and we call it PERCEPTION,* a taking *through* [something else].

[t. u. v.] Hegel concludes this chapter by alluding to the Mysteries which were remnants of religious rites of Western Asia, wherein was celebrated the consciousness that the essence of man is supersensual and immortal, i. e. abides through mediation, and does not perish like the food of the body. Even animals act as though they knew that sensuous things are not permanent or true, but destructible (or digestible even). But one who should undertake a complete description of a sensuous object would find the task interminable, for the reason that new peculiarities would arise in it, through its changeable nature, faster than he could describe them.

The next chapter is a consideration of Perception.

* German=*Wahrnehmung*.